UNDSS-SOMALIA SIOC UNDSS-SOMALIA SIOCUNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES To: Somalia SMT, Somalia Security Cell, FSCO Hargeysa, DSS East African Desk, DSS TRUThreat Information Received: Several reports from local contacts, open source media and member states indicate a possible planned operation in Somaliland before/during/after the Presidential elections. SIOC Comments: The below is a commentary of the Information reports received; UNDSS-SOMALIA SIOC UNDSS-SOMALIA SIOCcredence to previous reporting of a recent graduation in May where it was reported that suicide bombers had completed training and were being dispatched.Potential Vulnerabilities: The DSS Team in Somaliland have raised the following issues that present potential vulnerabilities:
SECURITY THREAT INFORMATION REPORT
Date: 7 June 2010
STI Report: SOM106072010: Possible Al-Shabaab (AS) plans against Somaliland 26 June, 2010 Presidential elections.
1.
a) Arrests of AS financier in Garowe and 3 cell members procuring equipment and supplies on 2 June 2010
b) AS makes media announcements to step up attacks in Somaliland and Puntland: 22 Jan 2010
c) Reportedly, nine young men from Somaliland arrived in Somaliland with the task to conduct suicide missions during the upcoming Presidential elections.
d) Meeting between Somaliland Dhulbahante religious order/clan elders and Al-Shabaab
2.
a) The suspected AS financier ((Siyad Abdirahman Jama’a)), arrested in Garowe had worked for WFP in the mid-nineties and various INGOs operating there. His knowledge of the UN system and INGO community is of great value to a planning process for terrorist operations. Three other AS members were also arrested recently in Garowe while procuring weapons and equipment. The significance of AS presence in Garowe is alarming since it was discovered that after the 29 October 2008 coordinated suicide bombing campaign in Somaliland where three suicide car bombers struck the presidential palace, the UN Development Program compound, and the Ethiopian Consulate in the city of Hargeysa in Somaliland, the equipment and financing originated from AS support cells in Garowe.
b) In late January 2010, speaking to a crowd in Ufurow district in the Bakool region, ((Mahad Omar Abdikarin)), Shabaab’s governor for the Bay and Bakool regions in southwestern Somalia, recently announced that AS will attack Somaliland. Abdikarin is a prominent leader who has publicly flaunted Shabaab’s link with al Qaeda and has urged foreign fighters to flock to Somalia. While this is common rhetoric AS leadership does have clan ties to Somaliland (see comment c) below.
c) According to local contacts and open source reporting, nine young men from Somaliland, who were trained by AS in a training camp in Bay region, arrived in Somaliland with the task to conduct suicide missions during the upcoming Presidential elections. Allegedly, three of the trained men already arrived in Hargeysa while the remaining six went to different towns including Berbera, Burao and Borama. They are expected to target International observers during the Election Day. Meanwhile, the Supreme leader of AS, ((Ahmed Abdi Godane)), who is from Hargeisa, as well as his deputy ((Ibrahim “Afghani”)), the mastermind of the attacks in Hargeisa 2008), gave his blessing to the nine “martyrs”. Additionally, most AS suicide bombers receive training in Bay/Bakool regions due to the influence of AS spokesman ((Muktar Robow)). This would lead
d) Members of Dhulbahante’s religious order and elders held a meeting with AS in Mogadishu. The meeting brought together members of Dhulbahante clan and senior members of AS. The Dhulbahante clans mainly inhabit parts of Sanag and Sool in Somaliland’s eastern regions. It is possible that AS and some members of the Dhulbahante clan who operate under the Northern Somalia Unionist Movement (NSUM) are in the planning stages to disrupt the Somaliland elections.
3.
a) SPU support to UN: SPU assets are likely to be re-deployed in support of the wider elections therefore reducing support to the UN in terms of static guard forces and in the event that critical road movement is needed, in terms of protected mobility. This may leave key locations more vulnerable to possible attack such as UN compounds and Hotels. Access controls and security guard forces have been the two biggest vulnerabilities in recent attacks against UN facilities.
b) Concentration of international presence. International (Non-UN) election observers are planned to be in Somaliland most of whom more than likely will be accommodated between the two main Hotels. This may present a desirable target of opportunity especially if perimeter security is depleted through the re-deployment of SPU at those key locations.
